Modest sociality: continuities and discontinuities A central claim in Michael's Bratman account of shared agency is that there need be no radical conceptual, metaphysical or normative discontinuity between robust forms of small-scale shared intentional agency, i.e., modest sociality, and individual planning agency. What I propose to do is consider another potential discontinuity, whose existence would throw doubt on his contention that the structure of a robust form of modest sociality is entirely continuous with structures at work in individual planning agency. My main point will be that he may be wrong in assuming that the basic cognitive infrastructure sufficient to support individual agency doesn't have to be supplemented in significant ways to support shared agency.
A central claim in Michael's Bratman account of shared agency is that there need be no radical conceptual, metaphysical or normative discontinuity between robust forms of small-scale shared intentional agency, i.e., modest sociality, and individual planning agency. What I propose to do is consider another potential discontinuity, whose existence would throw doubt on his contention that the structure of a robust form of modest sociality is entirely continuous with structures at work in individual planning agency. My main point will be that he may be wrong in assuming that the basic cognitive infrastructure sufficient to support individual agency doesn't have to be supplemented in significant ways to support shared agency.
Björn Petersson (Lund)
Bratman, Searle, and Simplicity. A comment on Bratman: Shared Agency, A Planning Theory of Acting Together
Abe Roth (Ohio State)
Practical Intersubjectivity and Normative Guidance: Bratman on Shared Agency
In an important new book, Michael Bratman offers a broadly reductive account of the norms of intention coordination in shared agency in terms of the norms of individual planning agency. I present examples to suggest that while Bratman's conditions may account for the satisfaction of interpersonal norms of intention coordination, they do not account for how they are normatively guiding. I go on to raise a question about Bratman's appeal to Gibbard to account for the explanatory force of the norms of planning intention. Finally, Bratman's account raises the very interesting issue of the function of shared intention, and the function of shared agency more generally. He suggests that shared intention functions to secure interpersonal coordination of action and planning. I agree, but contend that shared intention also functions to secure power sharing amongst participants.
Michael Bratman (Stanford)

Replies
SYMPOSIUM ON SOCIALLY EXTENDED MINDS Mattia Gallotti (London)
Collective Intentionality: A Case of Socially Extended Minds?
Discussions of group agency and cognitive integration are often premised on the idea that forms of social life can be cognitively incorporated to yield mental attitudes. In this introduction, I shall elaborate on this line of argumentation to give a general outline of the symposium.
Colin Allen & Robert Goldstone (Indiana)
Group Level Cognition
In the 25 minutes allotted to us, I will reiterate the main argument from Theiner, Allen & Goldstone (2010) and then consider a recent objection from KL (unpublished conference presentation) that is based on his recent work analyzing group action sentences, such as in his 2014 OUP chapter. In particular, I will argue that his analysis of collective actions (and by extension, capacities to perform those actions), as the mereological sum of individual primitive actions contributing to a single event, is too coarse-grained to capture distinctions that exist among cognitive models of group-level capacities. I will further argue that the weight KL places on his intuition that groups lack original intentionality, and are not (primitive) agents except in a very deflated sense, reveals an ontological bias that is not responsive to the kinds of evidence leading cognitive scientists to investigate and model distinctive group level capacities in such areas as group problem solving and transactive memory. If there is time, I will try also to indicate how collective intentionality may be discriminated from the mereological sum of individual intentions by way of an analogy to the levels of selection debate in evolutionary biology.
Bryce Huebner
Transactive planning
It is often suggested that collective intentions are employed in the production and guidance of collective actions, and that these intentions have a similar status to individual intentions. The arguments for this claim often depend on claims about our everyday practice of ascribing mental states. I will show that some collective intentions are realized by interfaced networks of computational and representational systems, and that these networks are realized by groups of individuals engaged in a process of transactive planning. In making my case, I will draw on Bratman's (2014) planning theory of agency, as well as recent work from cognitive neuroscience on supra-personal cognitive control (Shea et al 2014) and we-mode cognition (Gallotti & Frith 2013 ). I will argue that some groups have the capacity to engage in collective planing, that the process of collective planning is distributed across the members of a group, and that the outcome is a collective action.
John Sutton
Otto in the Wild: aging, collaboration, and socially distributed cognition Otto (Clark & Chalmers 1998) skilfully employs his notebook to cope with incipient decline in his biological memory capacities. I adopt an indirect route towards a defence of Clark & Chalmers' claim that Otto's beliefs and memories may be partly distributed across brain, body, and reliable external resources like the notebook. Our metaphysical assessments of ideas about distributed cognition might be usefully guided by the relevant sciences. Building on Deborah Tollefsen's use of the case of Otto to connect ideas about extended and collective cognition, I ask how real Ottos get by in the wild as they begin to feel the effects of dementia. In many cases, cognitive artifacts like Otto's notebook are richly complemented in practice by social support and other forms of scaffolding. I describe and integrate empirical findings on collaborative recall in general, and on the different effects and roles of collaboration for older adults. In particular, some long-standing couples have effectively distributed memory, managing different forms of remembering by working together, calling on each other and on external aids by way of both explicitly negotiated strategies and routinized tacit processes. In such cases, changes or disruptions to the relevant social or material systems can also in certain circumstances be disruptions to memory itself: such changes may have increased impact when neural memory systems begin to fade. I apply these considerations to an existing puzzle in Alzheimer's research about the nature of cognitive reserve in older adults with significant neuropathology who nonetheless show no clear signs of cognitive decline. The paper concludes by discussing how these applied and empirical considerations relate to the theoretical debate about socially and materially distributed cognition.
Deborah Tollefsen (Memphis)
Socially Extended Cognition and Epistemic Responsibility
SYMPOSIUM ON THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION Jillian Jordan, Paul Bloom, and David Rand (Yale)
Explaining third party punishment: a self-interested signal of cooperativeness Third-party punishment is ubiquitous and is thought to play a key role in the evolution and maintenance of human cooperation, but the ultimate mechanisms underlying it are poorly understood. Here, we present evidence from studies employing incentivized economic games that third-party punishment is perceived as, used as, and actually is a signal of cooperative behavior. We also present evidence that people retaliate against hypocritical punishers who punish selfishness but are selfish themselves, providing a potential mechanism by which punishment remains an honest signal of cooperation. Together, our data suggest that third-party punishment may be a self-interested strategy for garnering repetitional benefits as a cooperator.
Robert Kurzon (University of Pennsylvania)
How Strong is the Taste for Altruistic Punishment?
Evidence from the laboratory has been taken to show that people engage in "altruistic punishment," enduring costs to harm those who have been uncooperative. In turn, altruistic punishment has been proposed as an important part of the explanation for the evolution of cooperation. More recent evidence, however, suggests that such findings should be understood with caution. Further laboratory studies show that the degree to which people punish goes down under a number of conditions, including 1) when such punishments are kept strictly anonymous, 2) when punishments are meted out to non-group members, 3) when such punishments invite additional counter-punishment, and 4) when subjects have the option to reward instead of punish. These patterns of data suggest that the taste for altruistic punishment might be quite modest.
Sara Mathew (ASU)
Norms of cooperation and punishment among acephalous Turkana herders reveal groupfunctional design in informal institutions Knowledge of the nature and scale of cooperation and punishment in acephalous societies is important for understanding the evolution of human cooperation. I will present data showing that: 1) the Turkana, an acephalous pastoral society in East Africa, sustain costly large-scale cooperation in warfare through informal sanctions against free riders; 2) Turkana norms regulating warfare benefit the ethno-linguistic group, not smaller social units; 3) Turkana norms regulating punishment help solve the second-order free rider problem and promote groupbeneficial punitive behavior. I will discuss how these findings shed light on the evolutionary processes that have shaped human cooperation and punishment.
Alan Sanfey (Donders Institute)
Cooperation & competition: insights from decision neuroscience Abstract: Our lives consist of a constant stream of decisions and choices, from the mundane to the highly consequential. The standard approach to experimentally examining decision-making has been to examine choices with clearly defined probabilities and outcomes, however it is an open question as to whether decision models describing these situations can be extended to choices that must be made by assessing the intentions and preferences both of oneself and of another social partner. This class of social decision-making offers a useful approach to examine more complex forms of decisions, which may in fact better approximate many of our real-life choices. I will present both behavioral, pharmacological, and neural data from several experiments where we have used existing and novel economic games to observe how players decide in real, consequential, social contexts, and will discuss how we can use these brain insights to build better models of human social preferences, in particular cooperation, by incorporating both psychological and neurobiological constructs.
SYMPOSIUM ON EXPLANATION OF SOCIAL ACTION Abe Roth (Ohio State)
Reasons explanation in the context of shared activity Abstract: How do reasons figure in the explanation of shared activity? I will argue that the entitlement to certain reasons in shared activity allows for them to figure in the intentional description of a participant's contribution to shared activity. This secures for those reasons an explanatory role they otherwise would not have. I will draw on two sorts of cases. In one, the agent is entitled to reasons had by another participant. In the second, the agent is entitled to reasons that are available only from the point of view of the group.
Michael Schmitz (Vienna)
Some modes of social action explanation In my contribution I criticize the traditional notion of a propositional attitude and introduce a conception according to which the subject of each intentional state represents its position vis-à-vis an object. For example, when we intend an action, we are aware of our intending position with regard to that action. Accordingly, I distinguish between subject mode representational content, position or attitude mode content, and object or what-content. I argue that this conception is well-placed to explain collective intentionality and social action. In particular, I try to show that at various levels of collective intentionality subject mode content is fundamental to explaining social action. We attend, act, believe and intend with others insofar as we represent them as co-subjects of positions with regard to actions and other objects of our intentionality. With regard to the non-conceptual level of joint attention, I describe the difference between experiencing others as co-subjects and as objects on the basis of empirical evidence from developmental psychology and argue that the former rather than the latter explains joint action. Analogous arguments are given for the conceptual and propositional we-mode level of collective intention and belief and for what I call "role mode", which is meant to help explain our actions in institutional contexts. For example, when we vote as members of ISOS, we perform a social action in a role mode.
Raimo Tuomela (Helsinki/Munich)
